Abstract. Formal modeling of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is hard, because they pose the double challenge of combined discrete-continous dynamics and concurrent behavior. Existing formal specification and verification languages for CPS are designed on top of their underlying proof search technology. They lack high-level structuring elements. In addition, they are not or not efficiently executable. This makes formal CPS models hard to understand and to validate, hence impairs their usability. Instead, we suggest to model CPS in an Active Objects (AO) language designed for concise, intuitive modeling of concurrent systems. To this end, we extend the AO language ABS and its runtime environment with Hybrid Active Objects (HAO). CPS models and requirements formalized in HAO must follow certain communication patterns that permit automatic translation into differential dynamic logic, a sequential hybrid program logic. Verification is achieved by discharging the resulting formulas with the theorem prover KeYmaera X. We demonstrate the practicality of our approach with case studies.
Introduction
Formal modeling of cyber-physical systems (CPS) poses a double challenge: first, their hybrid nature, with both continuous physical dynamics and complex computations in discrete time steps. Second, their concurrent nature: distributed, active components (sensors, actuators, controllers) execute simultaneously and communicate asynchronously. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to get models of CPS right. But to be useful in practice, a formal modeling language must support validation [24] , i.e. to ensure that the model correctly captures a system and its requirements. Existing modeling languages for CPS, however, are designed for verification: to prove that a formal model satisfies formal properties. Examples include hybrid automata [2] , hybrid process algebra [11] , and logics for hybrid programs [26] . Models written in these languages are hard to read, because they are expressed in terms of the underlying verification technology: automata, algebras, formulas. They lack high-level structuring elements such as types, scopes, methods, complex commands, futures, etc. In addition, these languages are not or not efficiently executable, a crucial aspect of validation.
We make a proposal to address the "usability gap" in modeling CPS while retaining the capability to formally verify properties of models. Our starting point is the Active Objects [8] language ABS (for: Abstract Behavioral Specification) [17] . It is an efficiently executable language, designed to model asynchronous, concurrent systems. ABS was used to model complex, real-world systems for cloud processing [1] , virtualized services [18] , data processing [21] , and railway operations [19] . It is designed for verifiability and has associated analysis and verification tools [32] , but it lacks the capability to model hybrid systems. That is offered by our suggested Hybrid ABS (HABS) language extension, generalizing Active Objects to Hybrid Active Objects (HAO): Active Objects extended with continuous dynamics. However, we do not endeavor to extend the existing verification system of ABS [12] to handle HAO. For once, this is a highly complex task; second, an expressive hybrid verification logic is available as differential dynamic logic (dL) [28, 29, 30] , implemented in the KeYmaera X system [13] .
Our approach is based on translation from HABS to dL: Hybrid models are developed and debugged in HABS-whose runtime environment is extended to handle HAO-and then formally verified against a safety property in KeYmaera X. Fig. 1 illustrates this: Verification ensures that all HAO created to satisfy a given precondition fulfill a given object invariant. An optional main block can be used to initialize a system model. This allows to verify concrete scenarios. Simulation of HABS models features a visualization component that produces graphs showing how the value of object fields changes over time.
HABS Model Hybrid Class
Main Block -proof obligations KeYmaera X does not yet support QdL [27] for distributed hybrid systems and its component-based techniques [25] are subject to strict interaction requirements. We solve this by identifying an interaction pattern for communication that we impose on HABS. It is general enough to permit intuitive and concise modeling of relevant case studies. The advantage of the pattern-based approach is that one can decompose the HABS verification problem into a set of independent sequential dL problems for each hybrid class. In this sense, verification is compositional.
The paper is structured as follows. Sect. 2 provides background on dL. Sect. 3 gives syntax and semantics of HABS, illustrated with water tank models. Sect. 4 describes verification, Sect. 5 compilation and simulation. Sect. 6 concludes.
Background: Differential Dynamic Logic
We briefly review differential dynamic logic (dL) [29, 30] as implemented in the interactive theorem prover KeYmaera X [13] . Differential dynamic logic expresses the combined discrete and continuous dynamics of hybrid systems in a sequential imperative programming language called hybrid programs. Its syntax and informal semantics are in Table 1 . Table 1 . Hybrid programs in dL
Program
Informal semantics ?ϕ
Test whether formula ϕ is true, abort if false x := θ Assign value of term θ to variable x x := * Assign any (real) value to variable x {x = θ & H} Evolve ODE x = θ for any duration t≥0 with evolution domain constraint H true throughout α; β Run α followed by β on resulting state(s) α ∪ β Run either α or β non-deterministically α * Repeat α n times, for any n ∈ N Hybrid programs provide the usual discrete statements assignment (x := θ), non-deterministic assignment (x := * ), test (?ϕ), non-deterministic choice (α∪β), sequential composition (α; β), and non-deterministic repetition (α * ). A typical modeling pattern combines non-deterministic assignment and test (e.g., "x := * ; ?H") to choose any value subject to a Boolean constraint H. Standard control structures are expressible, for example:
* ; ?¬H. For continuous dynamics, the notation {x = θ & H} represents an ordinary differential equation (ODE) system (derivative x in time) of the form x 1 = θ 1 , . . . , x n = θ n . Any behavior described by the ODE stays inside the evolution domain H, i.e. the ODE is followed for a non-deterministic, non-negative period of time, but stops before H becomes false. For example, a basic model of the water level x in a tank draining with flow −f is given by the ODE {x = −f & x ≥ 0}, where the evolution domain constraint x ≥ 0 means the tank will not drain to negative water levels. With a careful modeling pattern, continuous behavior can be governed by H so that one can react to events, but it is not otherwise restricted or influenced: The pattern {x = θ & H}∪{x = θ & H} permits control intervention to achieve different behavior triggered by an event. H is the weak complement of H: they share exactly their boundary from which both behaviors are possible. For example, H ≡ x ≤ 0, H ≡ x ≥ 0.
The dL-formulas ϕ, ψ relevant for this paper are propositional logic operators ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ → ψ, ¬ϕ and comparison expressions θ ∼ η, where ∼ ∈{<, ≤, = , =, ≥, >} and θ, η are real-valued terms over {+, −, · , /}. In addition, there is the dL modal operator [α]ϕ. The dL-formula [α]ϕ is true iff ϕ holds in all states reachable by program α. The formal semantics of dL [29, 30 ] is a Kripke semantics in which the states of the Kripke model are the states of the hybrid system. The semantics of a hybrid program α is a relation α between its initial and final states. Specifically, ν |= [α]ϕ iff ω |= ϕ for all states (ν, ω) ∈ α , so all runs of α from ν are safe relative to ϕ.
Hybrid Active Objects
Active Objects [8] are strongly encapsulated objects that realize actor-based concurrency [15] with futures [7] and cooperative scheduling: Active Objects communicate via asynchronous method calls. On the caller side of a method invocation each time a future is generated as a handle to the call's result once it is available. The caller may synchronize on that future, i.e. suspend and wait until it is resolved. At most one process is running on an Active Object at any time. It only suspends when it encounters the synchronization statement await on an unresolved future or a false Boolean condition. Once the guard becomes true, the process may be re-scheduled. All fields are strictly object-private.
Hybrid Active Objects (HAO) extend Active Objects with continuous behavior, expressed by ODE over "physical" fields. These change their value following their ODE whenever time passes, even when no process is active. Example 1. Fig. 2 shows on the left an HAO model of a water tank that either fills with 1 2 l/sec or is drained with the same speed. Method ctrl() realizes a control loop that sets the drain field to switch between those states so that the level stays between 3l and 10l. Fields level, drain are physical. Their initial value and governing ODE is declared in the physical section. The controller suspends until level <= 3 | level >= 10 holds, i.e. until the water level reaches the upper or lower limit. Depending on which is the case, it changes the state and calls itself recursively.
The JML style comments provide an assumption on the initial state and the safety condition that in this case can be proven: if the initial level is between 4l and 9l, then it always stays between 3l and 10l. Before one attempts to formally verify this property one typically wants to run some tests to see whether it behaves as intended. Our HABS implementation allows to simulate and visualize an HAO model. For example, the graph in Fig. 2 on the right shows the behavior of a CSingleTank object instantiated with inVal = 5. In Sec. 4 we show how the class is translated into dL and prove the safety condition in KeYmaera X for any object created with a parameter that satisfies the precondition.
Hybrid ABS
We formally define the Hybrid Abstract Behavioral Specification (HABS) language based on ABS [17] . The syntax is in Fig. 3 Controller methods realize control loops. They may call port methods of other objects in each round after the initial await suspension statement. Port methods neither suspend nor call other methods. The first rule in the grammar for Port declares out-port, the second in-port methods. An out-port returns a field, an in-port copies its parameter into a field.
There are two kinds of guards: diff e suspends until the expression e evaluates to true, duration(e1,e2) suspends between e1 and e2 time units. The call e.m is shorthand for an asynchronous call directly followed by synchronization on its future. The call e!m is asynchronous and this.m is a standard internal synchronous call. Each HABS program is well-typed according to [6, 17] plus: (i) the method calls at the end of controllers implement direct recursion; (ii) the structure of controllers is to read from out-ports of other objects into local fields, followed by Example 2. Fig. 4 shows a water tank realized by two objects: a controller FlowCtrl and the tank itself Tank. The Tank has an in-port inDrain and an out-port method outPort. It has no controller, the run method is empty.
The controller's fields drain, level are its local copies of the state of the tank. The controller method first updates level, decides on the state of drain, then pushes the (possibly changed) state of drain to the tank. No time passes in the controller after suspension which ensures that the copied fields are synchronized at the end of the round. As the Tank's fields are not directly accessible to the FlowCtrl instance it is not possible to wait on the Tank's level. Instead, every tick seconds the controller is run.
The Tank interface specification declares an input requirement and a guarantee on returned values. The precondition of the inDrain method specification is a constraint on the input parameter. The timed_requires clause stipulates that the inDrain method must be called at least once per second.
Semantics of HABS
HABS extends the SOS semantics for Timed ABS [6] and only requires three small extensions: (i) include the physical behavior in the object state; (ii) determine whether a differential guard holds and, if not, when it will at the earliest; (iii) update the state whenever time passes. These affect only expression evaluation and auxiliary functions. No new SOS rule in addition to [6] is needed.
States. The state of an object has two parts: (i) a store σ, that maps (physical and non-physical) fields to values and the variables of the active process to values, and (ii) F , the set of solutions of the ODE in its physical block. A solution f is a function from time to a store which only contains the physical fields. The state and the solutions are connected: for each f ∈ F and each physical field f the following holds:
Semantics of Differential Guards. The semantics of an await g statement is to suspend until the guard holds, i.e. until g returning the time t that may maximally elapse without the guard evaluating to true, or ∞ if this is never the case. We start with the semantics of expressions containing physical fields.
Definition 1 (Semantics of Expressions with Physical Fields).
Let F be the set of solutions of an object o. Given a state σ of o, we can check whether F is a model of an expression e at time t. Let f p be a physical field and f d a discrete field of o. The semantics of fields f p , f d , unary operators !, -and binary operators ∼ ∈ {|, &, >=, <=, +, -, *, /} is defined as follows:
Outside differential guards, only the evaluation in the initial state v c F,0 σ is needed and this expression is never ∞. Next we define mte(e): the maximal time that may elapse without missing an event is the minimal time needed by the system to evolve into a state where the guard holds. This yields also the semantics of the guard itself. We identify · Time Advance. The characteristic feature of hybrid objects is that their (physical) state changes when time advances, even when no process is active. This is expressed in the semantics by a function adv (σ, t) which takes a state σ, a duration t, and advances σ by t time units:
Hence, for non-hybrid Active Objects adv (σ, t) = σ. Here the function is only needed to modify the process pool of an object for scheduling, not its state, and used exactly as in [6] .
Verification

Overview
With verification we mean essentially that an HAO satisfies its class invariant provided that the constraints expressed in the preconditions are met. We make this precise now. A class specification is a tuple (inv, pre, TReq, Req, Ens), where inv is the class invariant, a dL formula over the fields and parameters of the class and pre is its precondition, a dL formula over the class parameters. TReq is the set of timed preconditions for in-port methods: dL formulas over a dedicated program variable with the method's name. Req is the set of preconditions for in-port methods: dL formulas over fields and the parameter of the methods. Ens is the set of postconditions for out-port methods: dL formulas over a dedicated program variable with the method's name. To verify a class, it is translated into a dL-formula that expresses relative safety at any point in time and has the following form:
The precondition C is composed of pre and restrictions on time and tick variables. As usual in controller verification, the program consists of a control part code C , followed by the evolution of the continuous behavior plant C . The safety C condition must hold after an arbitrary number of iterations. It contains inv, preconditions of in-port methods of referred objects, and postconditions of own out-port methods. The following translation of a HABS class and its specification defines formally how the placeholders are composed. 
Translation
We need two operations on program sets P . The first constructs a program that non-deterministically executes one of the arguments. The second constructs all programs that execute all arguments in some order.
The translation has four phases: (i) provision of program variables, (ii) code generation, (iii) generation of the safety condition, (iv) provision of ODEs and constraints. We assume a fixed class C with some technical constraints: 1. If a controller writes to an in-port method of another object, then it reads from all out-port methods of the objects that occur in the precondition of that inport method. 2. Every duration statement has two identical parameters. 3. Inport methods with a timed precondition are only called from timed controllers. 4. Local variable names are unique.
Program Variables. For each field, parameter, and local variable in C there is a program variable with the same name. For each method m there is a time variable t m ∈ Time, for each in-port method m a tick variable tick m ∈ Tick, both type Real; tick m models the unknown time when an in-port method is called next.
Controller. The translation of ABS statements to hybrid programs is in Fig. 5 . We discuss the non-obvious rules: Calls to in-port methods of other objects are mapped to ?true (i.e. skip), because there is no effect on the caller object. A read from an out-port method is mapped to a non-deterministic assignment, such that the read value adheres to the postcondition of the called out-port method. The translation of an in-port or a controller has the form
-For a timed controller m with body await duration(e,e); s; this.m(), check ensures that the correct duration passed and cleanup resets the clock: Let M be the set of all translations of in-port methods and controllers, then:
The controller code C first executes all controllers in a non-deterministically chosen order, then allows each controller/in-port to be run again. The latter replicates eager ABS behavior on satisfied guards: when a differential controller is triggered and its guard still holds after its execution, then in ABS the controller is run again. We do not translate out-port methods and the run method. Out-port methods have no effect on an object state and their post-condition is guaranteed at any point in time. The run method only sets the system up and guarantees that every controller has the chance to run before the plant.
Precondition and Safety Condition. The precondition C is C's precondition pre plus restrictions on the time and tick variables: in the beginning each clock starts at zero and the tick variables have an unknown positive value. Additionally, all initalizations of physical fields are added as equations. For example, Real r = param + 2 results in r . = param + 2. The set of all such initializations is init.
The safety condition is C's invariant inv plus requires clauses of the used inport methods of other objects. Recall technical constraint 1 above. It ensures that at the moment an in-port is called, the caller object has a correct copy of the callee state. For a timed controller with guard duration(e,e), for each called in-port method its timed precondition ϕ is added, but the method name in ϕ replaced with trans(e). The set of modified preconditions is TReq . Req are preconditions of used in-port methods of other classes than C, where the parameter is replaced by the field passed to it. Ens are the postconditions of all out-port methods of C, then:
Plant. The plant of a class C has the form
where ode is the ODE from its physical block, ode t describes the clock variables, and the constraints c ∈ C partition the domain of the physical fields. The boundaries of the subdomains overlap exactly where the differential guards hold. 3 This models guards as events in dL, following the modeling pattern described in Sect. 2. To ensure that no differential guard is omitted, it is necessary that no two differential guards share a program variable. This is not a restriction, because two controllers can be merged with a disjunction as in Expl. 1.
To define C let e 1 , . . . , e m be the translations of differential guards in the class and e i the weak complement of e i . Let t 1 , . . . , t l be all time variables introduced for timed controllers with e ti the expression in the duration statement. Let pt 1 , . . . , pt k be all time variables introduced for in-port methods and tick pti the associated tick variable. We set ode t ≡ {t 1 = 1, . . . , t l = 1, pt 1 = 1, . . . , pt k = 1} and define:
Remark. Instead of using the parameter precondition one can verify one specific object created in a main block with a precondition that characterizes it precisely.
-Our translation generates a few basic invariants for handling hybrid programs of the form α * . These include the safety condition, the fact that the inner loop in code does not advance time, and information on fields with final values. These invariants are usually not sufficient, but a starting point for manual specification. Theorem 1. Let P be a set of classes. If for each C ∈ P the formula ϕ C (1) is valid, then for every main block that creates objects satisfying pre of C, in every reachable state all objects satisfy inv of C.
The main observations behind this theorem are: 1. The dL program omits no events, because each event is at a boundary of two evolution constraints on a variable and no two events share a variable (each controller has its own time variable); 2. the evolution constraints cover all possible states, so no run is rejected, because the domain is too small; 3. each test in ϕ C that discards runs, does so using a condition that has been proven. For example, the test that discards all runs of an in-port method for inputs not satisfying its precondition is safe, because on the caller-side this condition is part of the safety condition. The theorem also relies on technical constraint 1 above and the fact that the recursive call is at the end of a controller which guarantee that at this moment the caller copy of the callee's state is consistent with the callee's actual state.
Case Study
We illustrate the HABS to KeYmaera X translation (introduced in Sect. 4.2 above) with the system in Fig. 4 . All files and mechanical proofs, the translation and the simulator are available online under formbar.raillab.de/hybrid_ abs/. We first give the translation of the two-object water tank, whose behavior for an initial level of 5 is shown on the left of Fig. 6 .
Tank. The in-port method of the Tank class gives rise to a time variable t inDrain and a tick variable tick inDrain . Following (4), precondition Tank is
The safety condition says the tank level stays in its limits and that outLevel adheres to its contract which happen to be identical. No in-port methods of other classes are used, hence:
The Tank class has no controller method, so only the inDrain method needs to be translated and we set code Tank ≡ p(p) * where p ≡ trans(inDrain), see (2):
tick inDrain := * ; ?tick inDrain > 0; ?tick inDrain < 1; t inDrain := 0
Our implementation attempts to generate useful invariants. For the example it proposes safety Tank ∧ old(inVal) . = inVal as a loop invariant for (p) * . The second conjunct is justified, because field inVal is not reassigned. The old function yields the value of its argument before the loop iteration. We do not attempt to validate the invariant, it serves barely as a starting point for the interactive proof. Obviously, code Tank can be simplified to p, so an invariant is not necessary.
The plant (6) is based on the physical block and the new clock variable (there are no differential guards), with the evolution constraint split along the new time variable t inDrain . ODEs of the form v = 0 are default and omitted.
Timed Controller. The precondition (4) and plant (6) of FlowCtrl are straightforward. The latter is defined, even though the physical block is not present.
The safety condition (5) is the timed precondition of the called inDrain method and the class invariant (subsumed by the precondition of inDrain):
Finally, the code code FlowCtrl is defined as q(q) * with
if (level ≥ 9.5) then {drain := − 1 2 }; t ctrlFlow := 0 Differential Controller. We give the translation of the tank CSingleTank from Fig. 2 to illustrate the handling of differential controllers. Its precondition and safety condition are again straightforward:
The plant and code interact. The plant separates the evolution domain into two parts, with the guard of the differential controller (the white areas in Fig. 6 ) defining their boundary. The gray areas are larger than the safe region defined by 3 <= level <= 10. This is necessary: If we used simply the complement of the safe region level <= 3 | level >= 10 as a guard and are in a program state at the boundary (the lower of the states indicated with a star on the right in Fig. 6 ), then the controller changes the state as shown by the arrow. But if the next state is on the boundary, then the guard is triggered, the controller runs again, and so on, without physical time being able to advance. The guard in Fig. 2 ensures that after the controller has run, the state is not on the boundary anymore. This behavior is visualized by our implementation, see the right part of Fig. 2 . The code has the form code CSingleTank ≡ r(r) * , with r defined as follows:
Simulation
The implementation of HABS is based on the ABS compiler [32] , can also be used stand-alone, and is not subject to the restrictions imposed for translation to level drain 3 10 Fig. 6 . Simulation of the two-object tank (l.) and events in the single-object tank (r.).
dL given in Fig. 3 . It allows unrestricted use of differential guards and includes ABS features such as synchronization via futures, a module system, product lines, and abstract data types. The ODEs of a class cannot be changed at runtime and are represented as a string in the class table. To compile differential guards correctly one needs to compute mte F σ (diff e) (Def. 2). To compute F , the ODEs and the current state of the physical fields are passed to Maxima [23] as an initial value problem. The solution is an equation system or an error. Currently, the simulator does not support non-unique solutions or non-solvable ODEs.
Afterwards, Maxima is invoked again, this time with a minimalization problem: it minimizes the time t with the equation system representing F as the constraints. The result is then handled in the same way as a parameter to a timed guard by the runtime system. Once time has passed and the suspended process is reactivated, the physical fields are updated according to F . To implement the time advance function adv , if the state of the object changes any physical field, the above procedure is executed again for every currently suspended differential guard to accommodate the result.
The output files used to visualize a program execution are of the form t 1 , F 1 , t 1 , F 2 , t 2 , . . . , F n , t n . Here t i are the points in time where the object schedules a process and F i the function describing its physical behavior in the previous suspended state. Each time a differential guard is reactivated, not only its state is updated, but the solution F i+1 and the reactivation time t i+1 are written to the output. Each object has its own output file. A Python script translates output files into a discrete dynamic graph in Maxima format which in turn calls gnuplot that is responsible for creating the graph. The output of one object is shown in Fig. 2 and an overlay of two objects in Fig. 6 . The latter shows how the state of the discrete controller lags behind the physical state of the tank.
Related & Future Work, Conclusion
Related Work. Recent efforts [25, 22] introduce component-based modeling and verification techniques for hybrid systems in dL to split the verification task into manageable pieces. Integrated tools such as Ptolemy [31] emphasize timing aspects, signals, and data flow between heterogeneous models and their simulation. Our work complements these efforts with user-friendly modeling constructs in a uniform modeling language, validation by simulation, and modular formal verification along system aspects through translation from HABS to dL.
Translation between languages for hybrid systems so far is centered on hybrid automata as a unifying notation [5, 4] . Others focus on the discrete fragment [14] . Our translation from HABS to dL translates full hybrid systems models written in a programming language, including annotations (e.g., starting and invariant conditions); it is soundly based on the formal semantics of HABS and dL.
Hybrid systems validation through simulation is approached with translation to Stateflow/Simulink [3] ; with a combination of discrete-event and numerical methods [9] ; with threat models for security analyses [20] ; and with co-simulation between control software and dedicated physics simulators [33, 10] . Here, we focus on safety verification, the distributed aspect of HABS models, and take a pragmatic first step for simulating continuous models.
Hybrid Rebeca [16] proposes to embed hybrid automata directly into the actor language Rebeca. In contrast to HABS, no simulation is available and verification is not object-modular, because the whole model is translated into a single hybrid automaton. Because of this, a number of boundedness constraints have to be imposed. The verification backend of Hybrid Rebeca does not support non-linear ODEs (our examples are linear, but HABS, KeYmaera X, and Maxima, support non-linear ODEs; HABS models with non-linear ODEs are found in the online supplement). Hybrid automata can be encoded in HABS, see Fig. 2 .
Only one model [19] uses Active Objects for a cyber-physical system, with the larger part of the model simulating the differential guards introduced here.
Future Work. We plan to extend the verification backend to more liberal differential guards and fields. We want to integrate the verification of hybrid properties described here with the verification of computation-heavy Active Objects, as implemented in the KeY-ABS tool [12] . We also plan to implement approximating the simulation of non-solvable ODEs and to perform a large case study.
Conclusion. Concurrent hybrid systems are not only difficult to verify formally, it is equally hard to validate a formal model of them. Both activities have conflicting demands, so we propose a translation-based approach: modeling is guided by patterns over hybrid programs and class specifications in HABS, a hybrid extension of the concurrent AO language ABS. These are automatically decomposed and translated in a semantics-preserving manner (Thm. 1) into sequential proof obligations of the verification-oriented differential dynamic logic dL and discharged by the hybrid theorem prover KeYmaera X. We illustrated the viability of our approach by two case studies that feature many complications: concurrent behavior, possible non-termination, correctness depending on timing constants, multi-dimensional domain, time lag in sensing, etc. Asynchronous method calls and differential guards keep the hybrid AO models succinct and intuitive, while simulation and visualization support their validation. Fig. 7 . Syntax for the concurrent object level. For convenience, we give the semantics of Timed ABS here. The content of this section is a reproduction of Section 4 in [6] , with kind permission of the authors. Fig. 7 gives the object layer of Timed ABS, which is extended in Fig. 8 to the runtime syntax.
Syntactic categories. C, I, m in
Name g in Guard s in Stmt a in Annotation Definitions. IF ::=interface I { [Sg] } CL ::= [[a]] class C [(T x)] [implements I] { [T x; ] M } Sg ::= T m ([T x]) M ::= [[a]] Sg {[T x; ] s } a ::= Deadline: d | Cost: d | Critical: b | Scheduler : e | a, a g ::= b | x? | duration(d, d) | g ∧ g s ::= s; s | skip | if b { s } [ else { s }] | while b { s } | return e | [[a]] x = rhs | suspend | await g | duration(d, d) rhs ::= e | new C (e) | e.get | o!m(e)e ::= case2 v {br} | . . . v ::= o | f | . . . s ::= duration2(d 1 , d 2 ) | . . . cn ::= | obj | msg | fut | cn cn tcn ::= cn clock(t) fut ::= f | fut(f, v) σ ::= x → v | σ • σ obj ::= ob(o, e, σ,
A Semantics
Configurations cn are sets of objects, invocation messages, and futures. A timed configuration tcn adds a global clock clock (t) to a configuration (where t is a value of type Time). The global clock is used to record arrival and finishing times for processes. Timed configurations live inside curly brackets; thus, in {cn}, cn captures the entire runtime configuration of the system. The associative and commutative union operator on (timed) configurations is denoted by whitespace and the empty configuration by ε.
An object obj is a term ob(o, e, σ, pr, q) where o is the object's identifier, e is an expression of type Process representing a scheduling policy, σ a substitution representing the object's fields, pr is an (active) process, and q a pool of processes. A substitution σ is a mapping from variable names x to values v. For substitutions and process pools, concatenation is denoted by σ 1 • σ 2 and q 1 • q 2 , respectively.
In an invocation message m(o, v, f, d, c, t), m is the method name, o the callee, v the call's actual parameter values, f the future to which the call's result is returned, d and c are the provided deadline and cost of the call, and t is a time stamp recording the time of the call. A future is either an identifier f or a term fut(f, v) with an identifier f and a reply value v. For simplicity, classes are not represented explicitly in the semantics, but may be seen as static tables of object layout and method definitions.
Processes and Process Lifting. A process {σ|s} consists of a substitution σ of local variable bindings and a list s of statements, or it is idle. By default, the local variables of a process include the variables method of type String, arrival of type Time, cost of type Duration, deadline of type Duration, start of type Time, finish of type Time, critical of type Bool, value of type Int, and destiny of type Name. Consequently, we can define a function lift which transforms the runtime representation of a process into the Timed ABS datatype of processes and a function select which returns the process corresponding to a given process identifier in a process queue, as follows:
The value of destiny is guaranteed to be unique, and is used to identify processes at the Timed ABS level.
A.1 A Reduction System for Expressions
The strict evaluation [[e] ] σ of functional expressions e, given in Fig. 9 , is defined inductively over the data types of the functional language and is mostly standard, hence this subsection only contains brief remarks about some of the expressions. Let σ be a substitution which binds the name deadline to a duration value. Otherwise it returns the idle process. The predicate fresh(n) asserts that a name n is globally unique (where n may be an identifier for an object or a future).
Transition rules transform state configurations into new configurations, and are given in Fig. 10 . We denote by a the substitution which represents the attributes of an object and by l the substitution which represents the local variable bindings of a process. In the semantics, different assignment rules are defined for side effect free expressions (Assign1 and Assign2), object creation (New-Object), method calls (Async-Call), and future dereferencing (Read-Fut). Rule Skip consumes a skip in the active process. Here and in the sequel, the variable s will match any (possibly empty) statement list. We denote by idle a process with an empty statement list. Rules Assign1 and Assign2 assign the
{ob(o, p, a, {l | await e; s}, q) cn} → {ob(o, p, a, {l | suspend; await e; s}, q) cn} value of expression e to a variable x in the local variables l or in the fields a, respectively. Rules Cond1 and Cond2 cover the two cases of conditional statements in the same way. (We omit the rule for while-loops which unfolds into the conditional.) Scheduling. Two operations manipulate a process pool q; pr •q adds a process pr to q and q \ pr removes pr from q. If q is a pool of processes, σ a substitution, t a time value, and cn a configuration, we denote by ready(q, σ, cn) the subset of processes from q which are ready to execute (in the sense that the processes will not directly suspend or block the object).
Scheduling is captured by the rule Schedule, which applies when the active process is idle and schedules a new process for execution if there are ready processes in the process pool q. We utilize a scheduling policy in an object ob(o, p, σ, idle, q), p is an expression representing the user-defined scheduling policy. This policy selects the process to be scheduled among the ready processes of the pool q.
In order to apply the scheduling policy p, which is defined for the datatype Process in Timed ABS, to the runtime representation q of the process pool, we lift the processes in q to values of type Process. Let the function liftall recursively transform a pool q of processes to a value of type List Process by repeatedly applying lift to the processes in q. The process identifier of the scheduled process is used to select the runtime representation of this process from q.
Note that in order to evaluate guards on futures, the configuration cn is passed to the ready function. This explains the use of brackets in the rules, which ensures that cn is bound to the rest of the global system configuration. The same approach is used to evaluate guards in the rules Await1 and Await2 below.
Rule Suspend suspends the active process to the process pool, leaving the active process idle. Rule Await1 consumes the await g statement if g evaluates to true in the current state of the object, rule Await2 adds a suspend statement in order to suspend the process if the guard evaluates to false.
In rule Activation the function bind(m, o,v, f, d, c, b, t) binds a method call to object o in the class of o. This results in a new process {l|s} which is placed in the queue, where l(destiny) = f , l(method) = m, l(arrival) = t, l(cost) = c, l(deadline) = d, l(start) = 0, l(finish) = 0, l(crit) = b, l(value) = 0, and where the formal parameters of m are bound to v.
Durations. A statement duration(e 1 , e 2 ) is reduced to the runtime statement duration2(d 1 , d 2 ), in which the expressions e 1 and e 2 have been reduced to duration values. This statement blocks execution on the object until the best case execution time has passed; i.e., until at least the duration d 1 has passed. Remark that time cannot pass beyond duration d 2 before the statement has been executed (see below).
Method Calls. Rule Async-Call sends an invocation message to [[e] ] a•l with the unique identity f of a new future (since fresh(f )), the method name m, and parameter values v. The identifier of the new future is placed in the configuration, and is bound to a return value in Return. The annotations are used to provide a deadline and a criticality which are passed to the callee with the invocation message. (The global clock provides a time stamp for the call.) Rule Return places the evaluated return expression in the future associated with the destiny variable of the process, and ends execution after recording the time of process completion in the finish variable. Rule Read-Fut dereferences the future fut(f, v). Note that if the future lacks a return value, the reduction in this object is blocked.
Object creation. Rule New-Object creates a new object with a unique identifier o . The object's fields are given default values by atts(C, [[e]] a•l , o , c), extended with the actual values e for the class parameters (evaluated in the context of the creating process) and o for this. In order to instantiate the remaining attributes, the process pr is active (we assume that this process reduces to idle if init(C) is unspecified in the class definition, and that it asynchronously calls run if the latter is specified). The object gets the scheduler in the annotation an (which is copied from the class or system default if a scheduler annotation is not provided).
Time advance. Rule Tick specifies how time can advance in the system. We adapt the approach of Real-Time Maude to Timed ABS and specify a global time which advances uniformly throughout the global configuration cn, combined with two auxiliary functions: adv(cn, d) specifies how the advance of time with a duration d affects different parts of the configuration cn, and mte(cn) defines the maximum amount that global time can advance. At any time, the system can advance by a duration d ≤ mte(cn). However, we are not interested in advancing time by a duration 0, which would leave the system in the same state. The auxiliary functions adv and mte are defined in Fig. 11 . Both have the whole configuration as input but consider mainly objects since these exhibit time-dependent behavior. The function mte calculates the maximum time increment such that no "interesting" occurrence (i.e., worst-case duration expires, duration guard passes) will be missed in any object. Observe that for statements which are not time-dependent, the maximum time elapse is 0 if the statement is enabled, since these statements are instantaneous, and infinite if not enabled, since time may pass when the object is blocked. Hence, mte returns the minimum time increment that lets an object become "unstuck", either by letting its active process continue or enabling one of its suspended processes. The function adv updates the active and suspended processes of all objects, decrementing all deadline values as well as the values in duration statements and duration guards at the head of the statement list in processes.
